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Abstract 
The killing of Micah Johnson by Dallas police on 8 July 2016 by a teleguided exploding robot is the first known 
example of the use of a killer drone by US law enforcement in the domestic arena. This repatriation of the 
drone, under conditions of racialized urban unrest designated as exceptional, was predicted by Didier Bigo 
(2014) and follows a familiar pattern whereby coercive security technologies are tested abroad before finding 
their way ‘home’ to arm police forces which are becoming increasingly paramilitary in style and conduct. I use 
the Dallas incident to probe the cogency and limits of ‘drone theory’ and to consider its application in domestic 
policing contexts. I work through three broadly delineated areas of scepticism about drone theory as it 
intersects with policing and, in so doing, develop my own account of the weaponized policing drone as a 
defining techno-cultural element within the emergent form of neoliberal political rationality I call 
‘governance’. 
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In the early hours of the morning of 8th July 2016, Dallas Police Department used a bomb 
disposal robot, which officers had modified to carry an explosive charge, to kill Micah 
Johnson after, in their words, ‘several hours’ of ‘negotiations’ had ‘broken down’ (Farivar, 
2016a). The preceding day, Johnson, a twenty-five year-old black US army reservist who had 
served in Afghanistan (2013-14), shot and killed five police officers, wounding a further nine 
and two civilians attending a Black Lives Matter rally taking place in Dallas to protest against 
the killings by police of two black men on the two preceding days elsewhere in the United 
States. This was not known at the time but following his return from Afghanistan Johnson 
had experienced symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and sought treatment for 
depression, anxiety, hallucinations, hearing voices and panic attacks; Johnson also 
reportedly wanted revenge for the killing of black men by white police officers. Following 
the shootings during the rally he fled to the second floor of a community college building, 
where he hid – among the computer servers at the end of a corridor of some 9m in length – 
from the SWAT team which had cornered him there. During the two to three hours of 
negotations with police which followed there was intermittent shooting in both directions 
and police accounts relate that Johnson taunted the officers, asking them how many of their 
colleagues he had killed and expressing a desire to kill more. After several hours Dallas 
police chief David Brown, who had been trained in counter-terrorism policing by the Israeli 
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army, authorised officers to kill Johnson using an explosive charge attached to the 
extendible arm of a bomb disposal robot, a Northrop Grumman Remotec Andros V-A1. They 
used the robot to deliver 1lb of the plastic explosive C-4 to the end of the corridor, where 
they detonated it, killing Johnson. At a press conference afterwards, Brown – who has since 
retired – was adamant that his decision to authorise use of the robot was taken in order to 
prevent further loss of police life: “We saw no other option but to use our bomb robot”, he 
said, “other options would have exposed our officers to grave danger”. Technology 
correspondent for The Washington Post, Brian Fung (2016), reported that ‘the whole idea 
was improvised in about 15 to 20 minutes’. Security and robotics expert Peter W. Singer, 
among others, asserted that this was the first time a robot had been used by police to kill, 
although Singer also claimed that bomb disposal robots had been rigged up in an ad hoc 
fashion, to kill, by US troops in Iraq (Farivar, 2016a). Ian Shaw (2017: 456) notes that when 
the invasion of Iraq began the US had ‘zero ground robots’ but had purchased 12,000 by 
2008 to counter the threat posed by improvised explosive devices.    
Although Shaw calls these ‘ground robots’ rather than ‘drones’, as Grégoire 
Chamayou (2015: 11) notes, the US army’s official definition of a ‘drone’ is ‘a land, sea, or 
air vehicle that is remotely or automatically controlled’. Nevertheless, the focus in 
Chamayou’s Drone Theory (2015 [2013]) is explicitly restricted to ‘unmanned combat aerial 
vehicles’ (UCAVs), as opposed to land-based killer robots of the sort improvised by Dallas 
police; similarly, Shaw’s Predator Empire (2016: 239) draws its far-reaching conclusions 
about ‘a society that is fundamentally alienated’ principally from drones of the airborne 
variety, though he also considers in detail the likely uses of such drones in ‘domestic’ 
policing. Even though the Dallas police’s drone strictly satisfies the US army’s official 
definition, their contraption lies at the outermost limits of what is currently understood by 
the term ‘drone’: land-based, apparently artisanally confected on the spot (rather than part 
of an already existing systematic programme) and standalone (detached from the elaborate 
profiling and targeting intelligence network which undergirds the drones operated by the 
CIA and US military abroad). Nevertheless, the fact that the Dallas drone is in these 
significant respects different from the drones which are the principal concern of 
Chamayou’s account, as of most other scholarship on drones, enables a probing exploration 
to test the cogency and limits of ‘drone theory’. Is the drone still a sufficiently stable and 
pertinent category and is drone theory still a useful critical tool or would it be better 
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subsumed into longer histories of air power and vertical domination, or contemporary 
activism against ‘killer robots’ and other (semi-)autonomous robotized violence? Rather 
than providing a staunch defence, a stinging critique or even an exhaustive account of 
Chamayou’s position (in particular, I am largely leaving the Hobbesian dimension to Arthur 
Bradley in his article for this special section), I intend here to approach it from a different 
angle by prioritising this example of an artisanal land-based killer drone deployed by police 
on US soil. I aim to contribute to a developing discussion which seeks to envisage drone 
theory’s plausible ‘domestic’ future forms (Neocleous, 2014; Wall, 2016; Shaw, 2016 and 
2017; this special section): ‘drones in the house’.    
 Drone theory has achieved critical perspective to the extent that it has succeeded in 
understanding drones as ‘techno-cultural’ assemblages (Gregory, 2011: 193) rather than 
simply as gadgets detached – as though by magic – from the wider historical, cultural and 
socio-economic contexts of their making, deployment and intelligibility. Drawing on Donna 
Haraway’s cyborg feminism, Alison Williams (2011: 382, 386) defined the drone as ‘an 
assemblage of human and machine elements’ and used this definition alongside empirical 
research to query claims by (in)security professionals that drones enable ‘“more-than-
human” vision abilities’. Lauren Wilcox (2017a: 25) followed Williams in warning against 
‘“[d]isembodied” theories of drone warfare that fetishize the drone’ and Christiane Wilke 
(2017: 1041) has shown how the drone’s way of seeing and targeting is really the result of 
‘collective, collaborative, and discursive’ practices of vision as they operate within rigidly 
hierarchical organizations with limited ‘spaces for contesting a dominant way of looking’. 
Although Chamayou’s Drone Theory examines the UCAV and its associated networks in 
considerable technical detail, which has led to him being accused of fetishizing the object of 
his critique (Noys, 2015: 4; Wilcox, 2017a: 13), he presents his book as a pointed 
intervention in the linguistic and cultural spheres against inflated rhetoric about drones 
from within commercial and governmental branches of the security establishment, which he 
claims has propagated ‘intense confusion’ about basic political and ethical concepts, even 
‘crises of intelligibility’ (14). He similarly characterizes claims about the ‘surgical’ accuracy of 
drone strikes as ‘discursive self-intoxication’ (64). Vital though it is for a critical drone theory 
to query the inflated rhetoric used to promote this technology, and to analyse the political 
meanings and productive fantasies enfolded in such claims, and so to be vigilant about 
unwittingly reproducing deadly hype, it is nevertheless also worth asking, with Benjamin 
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Noys (2015: 3, 16), why the drone has come to be so fetishized and freighted, so charged 
with ‘metaphysical “aura”’, and I shall return to this point later. The most far-reaching drone 
theory (Chamayou, 2015; Shaw, 2016a and 2016b; Wall, 2016) takes a techno-cultural, a 
synecdochic and to some extent an anticipatory approach: the drone is worth analysing in 
itself but also because it stands in for something bigger of which it is a significant 
functioning part and because it can be considered a harbinger of a still more sinsiter 
configuration of power – the ‘Predator Empire’ (Shaw, 2016b), the ‘drone-state’ (Chamayou, 
2015: 18) or ‘emerging dronepolis: the city of the drone’ (Shaw, 2016a: 19). The drone is 
thus understood synecdochally as a defining techno-cultural element within an emergent 
new form of political rationality, though I argue that what exactly this emergent form is has 
yet to be satisfactorily identified and I endeavour to contribute here to its elaboration. 
 Chamayou’s Drone Theory builds on his earlier book, Manhunts: A Philosophical 
History (2012), which developed a historico-philosophical account of ‘cynegetic’ (hunting) 
power. The terms of that analysis strongly recall Foucault’s typolgy of power (sovereign, 
disciplinary, pastoral, biopolitical), as supplemented with ‘necropower’ (Mbembe, 2001), 
and while it could be objected that pastoral power as Foucault conceived it already implied 
the power to hunt not only predators who menaced the flock but also individual lost sheep 
as part of a very muscular form of ‘care’, by giving it a name and identifying historical 
examples, Chamayou (2012) certainly draws dramatic attention to this dimension of 
pastoral power; in relation to Mbembe, cynegetic power could be described as the 
necropolitical dimension of pastoral power, although these three rival typologies cannot be 
entirely reconciled. Chamayou (2012: 59) defines the police in its Modern form as ‘a hunting 
institution, the state’s arm for pursuit, entrusted by it with tracking, arresting, and 
imprisoning’. In Drone Theory Chamayou (2015: 68) argues that US drone killings abroad 
have increasingly come to embody the policing paradigm of counter-terrorism as opposed 
to the military doctrine of counterinsurgency. Whereas counterinsurgency involves 
considering the side-effects of any intervention on the surrounding population, so is to that 
extent political, counter-terrorism involves hunting down individuals. Anticipating 
Chamayou’s argument, Tyler Wall (2013: 44) argued that ‘the unmanned military hunts so 
clearly important to the war on terror belong not only to the logic of war, but to the logic of 
police’, though he suggested that it was ‘too early’ to understand ‘the specific ways police 
drones might also induce fear and terror into citizens in the Global North’ (Wall, 2013: 48). 
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Five years later, it may still be ‘too early’ to be conclusive but the Dallas incident and some 
provocative scholarship on the imbrication of war power with policing power (Neocleous, 
2014; Wall, 2016) in the intervening years invite a new critical appraisal of drone theory as it 
pertains to ‘domestic’ policing. 
 I will use the Dallas incident to frame a discussion of three sceptical views of drone 
theory as it intersects with policing: (i) the novelty, potency and significance of drones have 
been overstated and one particular type of drone (the UCAV) has dominated at the expense 
of other commercial and security drones, including ground-based and humanitarian drones 
– drones are not so special after all; (ii) a far richer, more historically literate and more 
critical understanding of policing is required to properly contextualize claims about ‘the 
militarization of the police’ – policing has always been violent; (iii) the drone operator may 
very well be a semi-automated extrusion of the repressive state apparatus but so is a 
marine or a police officer – like the police, drones are instruments of bureaucracy. As I 
traverse these three areas of doubt I build my own account of the policing drone. 
 
 
(i) Drones are not so special after all 
 
Mark Neocleous (2014: 155) asserts that ‘the drone is not as new or as revolutionary as 
many would like to claim’. Gregory (2011: 189) noted the ‘numerous dispiriting parallels’ 
between British aerial counterinsurgency in the 1920s along the North-West Frontier (later 
Pakistan) and in Mesopotamia (later Iraq) and US drone operations today but Neocleous 
(2014: 143, 156) draws much stronger conclusions from this same colonial precedent, 
describing ‘air police’ as ‘the colonial state’s main weapon of pacification between the two 
World Wars’ and arguing that ‘air power has always been police power’, a form of power for 
which – by contrast with conventional limits to military power exercised between sovereign 
nation states in the same era – ‘there are no civilian areas and there are no civilians’. 
According to Neocleous (2014: 145), air power was used by British colonial authorities in the 
1920s to police, pacify and assert their new order, by destroying forms of subsistence which 
could have allowed the colonized population to evade the system of primitive accumulation 
being imposed upon them, as well as by targeting areas of resistance. In Neocleous’s 
analysis, the coercive material edge of this ‘air police’ – aerial bombardment – also 
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produced a range of intimidatory psychotechnical effects, which made it a ‘way of 
communicating’ to the dominated their ‘subordination to the technical, military and political 
superiority of the force behind the bombing’ (Neocleous, 2014: 150, emphasis original). 
Tyler Wall (2016) takes up Neocleous’s reconceptualization of the drone as an expression of 
a policing power older and wider than that exercised by the domestic police forces which 
emerged in the nineteenth century and suggests that this ‘helps to de-fetishize the seeming 
“newness” of drone violence by locating this terror not only within the police mandate, but 
within longer transnational histories of racial capitalism’ (Wall, 2016: 1123-4). Neocleous’s 
reconceptualization of drones in terms of police power is one moment in his wider 
intellectual project to resituate the institutional forms of Modern policing as they emerged 
in liberal nation states in the nineteenth century within a much longer and more sinister 
history of police power as ‘a form of governing’ bound up with primitive accumulation and 
capitalist domination more broadly (Neocleous, 2000: 4, emphasis original). I find the wider 
frame of Neocleous’s project remarkably compelling but I would like to probe his treatment 
of the policing drone, in particular his analysis of one of its historical antecedents. 
 For Neocleous the British colonial ‘air police’ of the 1920s was bound up with a 
package of governing practices which blended the administrative, the coercive and the 
psychotechnical. Air power was a way of communicating to the colonized in so far as its 
bombing and strafing of civilians were useful not only for the damage they could directly 
inflict on rebels and the material substrate of the pre-colonial subsistence economy but also 
for their indirect psychotechnical effects on the wider population; moreover, RAF planes 
sometimes directly communicated with populations by dropping leaflets warning of 
impending attacks and allowing friendly tribes to display agreed signals to escape the 
bombing (Lieb, 2012: 638). The use of force in the form of air power was part and parcel of a 
system of administration geared for wealth-extraction. Conversely, techniques of colonial 
government such as the imposition of taxes, which may appear to be primarily 
administrative, were intended to have the coercive effect of destroying the subsistence 
economy and largely succeeded in this purpose; the authorities’ response to rebels’ refusals 
to pay new taxes was, in turn, bombing (Neocleous, 2014: 146-7). Peter Lieb (2012: 634-5) 
adds that British counterinsurgency operations in Mesopotamia were ‘heavily influenced by 
racist stereotypes of a populace that would only react to the language of force, coercion, 
and suppression’, a condescending yet curiously mixed empathic-puntive-pastoral view of 
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Arabs and Kurds as ‘semi-civilised’ peoples who had been schooled into savagery by long 
years under the Ottoman yoke, but who could yet be civilized by more civilized colonial 
rulers. A neo-colonialist latter-day variant of this empathic-punitive-pastoral understanding 
can be discerned in the intensive domestic policing of largely racialized ‘surplus populations’ 
(Wall, 2016a) in the Global North today, which registers the historic collective trauma of 
slavery and discrimination but only to infer that in its angry aftermath the language of 
coercion is best suited to conducting the conduct of these particular populations. 
 However, air power was not used in isolation by the British in Mesopotamia – at the 
height of the insurgency around 100,000 ground troops were also deployed (Lieb, 2012: 
641, n.13) – and it was in conjunction that missions to raze hundreds of rebel villages to the 
ground were conducted, with ground troops taking care of other somewhat more precise 
punitive actions such as cutting off water, confiscating cattle, destroying crops and in all 
likelihood shooting armed rebel prisoners on the spot. In other words, the British ‘air police’ 
of the 1920s worked alongside large numbers of land-based ‘drones’ as parallel extrusions 
of a system of colonial rule. While British military strategists were favourably surprised by 
the impact of air power, they had started out with very low expectations of its capacity 
(Lieb, 2012: 638); from the subsequent flights of their theoretical fancy in the interwar years 
it would be a mistake to assume that air power was decisive in Mesopotamia or to ignore 
the sizeable accompanying deployment of ground troops but Neocleous’s account of 
historical antecedents of the drone tends at times in each of these directions. 
 Considered as a ‘way of communicating’ (Neocleous, 2014: 150), the drones of today 
– like the British colonial ‘air police’ of the 1920s and air power more generally – are saying 
significantly more than that somebody is watching and ready to strike, although they are 
certainly saying that. With their verticalizing transformation of the battlefield into the 
battlespace and their surveillant grasp of the electromagnetic spectrum, as Eyal Weizman 
(2002) argued in the case of the West Bank, ‘Every floor in every house, every car, every 
telephone call or radio transmission, even the smallest event that occurs on the terrain, can 
thus be monitored, policed or destroyed from the air’. Chamayou (2015: 54) quotes this 
remark of Weizman’s and suggests that the communicative effects of drones can be 
understood in terms of such a militarized ‘politics of verticality’ (53). Airborne drones 
communicate by way of verticalized power projection: their occupation of the vertical also 
speaks a crude positional allegory of the brute fact of domination and subordination, the 
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political reality of superiority and inferiority, above and below: ‘In keeping with deep 
traditions in Western culture and languge, commentators see their top-down view as one of 
inherent superiority over the subjugated, less important, and racialised people – or even 
dehumanised non-people – far beneath the gaze’ (Graham, 2016: 68). In so doing, airborne 
drones tap into the same culturally charged – but thoroughly entangled – metaphysico-
theological valorization of ascent up the vertical axis which arguably explains much enduring 
belief in the justice of social and institutional hierarchies, even among those who suffer 
most from them.  
In their review of drone scholarship, Francisco Klauser and Silvana Pedrozo (2015: 
285) complained that ‘civil and commercial applications of drones have remained widely 
unnoticed in academic research’. Since then, the frenzy with which leading corporations 
have trumpeted their present and future investment in drone technology (Mercer, 2018) 
has mirrored the way in which the skylines of global cities now compete to erect ‘super-tall 
towers’ that are ‘ultra-vain – and some would say suspiciously phallic – embodiments of the 
super-rich’, designed to attract inward flows of global capital (Graham, 2016: ix). It should 
be presumed that state agencies, including the police and military, are anything but immune 
from these same cultural, metaphysical and psycho-sexual entanglements and that 
whatever practical rational justifications may be proffered for taking to the skies, the drive 
to project vertical power is, in the commercial as in the security sphere, to a significant 
extent about symbolizing dominance in order to lure inward flows of capital investment. 
Indeed, Mark Salter (2014) has suggested that state security agencies may be significantly 
less immune, by temperament and training, to such environing cultural pressures than their 
business counterparts: he recontextualizes the notion of ‘police militarization’ within what 
he argues is a pervasive militarization of the wider culture, in which ‘idealised 
representations’ of the technological superiority of weapons systems and military life have 
been ‘surreptitiously militarising the subject positions available to consumers’ (166). Noting 
that drones had been used by British police forces for two whole years before resulting in a 
single arrest, which achievement led indirectly to the comic death by drowning of the drone 
in question, Salter (2014: 171, 172) argues that it is evident that ‘police interest in 
purchasing drones far outweighs their practical utility’ and that ‘drones may be appealing to 
police at least in part because their “excess capacity” for weaponisation operates as a 
signifier of the individual power of the police officer and collective status of the police 
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force’. Expressing mastery in and of the vertical, airborne drones have thus become potent 
phallic signifiers in a technophilic language of commercial and security supremacy, which is 
why feminist critique of inflated claims about their superhuman capacities to see, discern 
and embody their targets is so necessary (Williams, 2011; Wilcox, 2017a; Wilke, 2017). Nor 
is such critique merely discursive since these technologies sell on the strength of the claims 
made about them and in so far as they are successful in channelling unconscious fantasies of 
potential buyers or the wider public, who exert pressure on politicians and police to invest 
in these new technologies. Unfortunately, as Noys (2015: 12-13) has suggested, this line of 
critique has had little traction, possibly because it has too little exposure beyond the 
scholarly literature. 
How is this discussion of airborne drones’ projection of power up the vertical axis 
inflected when the focus shifts to horizontal land-based drones of the type used to kill 
Micah Johnson? As the rigged up bomb-disposal robot was manoeuvred into place down 
the 9m corridor, it was as though its gradual movement recaptured the horizontal for 
security: no longer would this plane signify equality and reciprocity – the space of those 
allegedly protracted ‘negotiations’ with which the police had probably lost patience, for it is 
too hard to credit their assertion that there was no other way to resolve the situation safely, 
as though making and detonating a bomb were safe. As the bomb robot advanced 
horizontally towards Johnson, its symbolic excess of force signified the technological 
prowess of the police and the exorbitance in their exercise of the ‘necropolitical prerogative 
of the liberal state’ (Wall, 2016: 1134). In the nearish future, it is probable that the domestic 
policing drone will move more along the horizontal and in the proliferating plurality of the 
swarm (Shaw, 2016b: 239) and less likely that it will resemble the solitary phallic projections 
of verticalized air policing said to be the antecedents of today’s militarized drone strikes 
abroad: ‘Swarms of tiny, armed drones, equipped with advanced sensors and 
communicating with each other, will thus be deployed to loiter permanently above the 
streets, deserts and highways’ (Graham, 2010: xiii). Ironically, to better adapt to the 
compressed verticality of the global city, its policing drones will need to be able to move 
quickly from the verticality of their antecedents’ power to track horizontally along the city’s 
strata.  
What it loses in symbolic potency by tempering its ‘politics of verticality’, the policing 
drone may gain in its pluralization as swarm. Wilcox (2017b: 26) has noted the disjuncture 
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between the way swarming insect life has been represented in utopian feminist science 
fiction and ‘Contemporary developments in artificial intelligence and warfare [which] 
suggest that the future of warfare will not be “robots” as technological, individualised 
substitutions for idealised (masculine) warfighters, but warfighters understood as swarms: 
insect metaphors for non-centrally organised, self-organising problem-solving’. There may 
be more at stake here than the reappropriation of a metaphor and Wilcox may be mistaken 
to read this as a disjuncture. Critics of ‘carceral feminism’ (Bernstein, 2010) have decried the 
excessive but often implicit investment of certain types of feminism in punitive and 
securitarian approaches: the swarming policing drone may also embody the disavowed 
punitive dimension of a carceral-feminist politics of ubiquitously watchful care. Anticipating 
the development of my argument in the third section, below, it may not be too fanciful to 
suggest that the policing swarm was already present at the killing of Johnson, himself a 
renegade military drone recently returned from the Afghan frontier, whose solitary acts of 
political violence were outsmarted by a swarm of police drones busying themselves along 
the horizontal plane of collaborative self-organised problem-solving to finally deploy 
themselves in the new human-machinic assemblage they had collectively improvised.  
 
 
(ii) Policing has always been violent 
 
The re-importation into domestic policing environments of weaponized drone technology 
first tried abroad was accurately predicted by Didier Bigo (2014: 134) as the logical 
development of trends within the (in)security industry. The land-based bomb disposal robot 
repurposed by Dallas police to deliver an explosive charge was one of many pieces of 
military hardware transferred to civilian law enforcement agencies under Section 1033 of 
the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, which allows transfers of surplus military 
equipment from the Department of Defense, especially where it can be used for counter-
drug and counter-terrorism purposes. From 2003, when transfers began, until May 2016 
there were 717 transfers from military stock to 280 law enforcement agencies across the US 
– a total of 987 items (Bard, 2016). The convergence of policing and military institutions, 
styles, techniques, approaches and operations has been widely discussed within critical 
security studies over the last two decades (Bigo, 1995: 55) and prior to that in critical 
 11 
policing studies, particularly scholarship focused on the paramiltary policing of Northern 
Ireland (Jefferson, 1990). The first transfers of military material to civilian police forces 
arguably occurred in the 1920s with tear gas and the United Kingdom led the way in the 
1970s and 80s with rubber bullets and other techniques developed in Northern Ireland and 
the suppression of the Miners’ Strike; it was only in the 1990s that the US became world 
leaders in this area (Balko, 2006; Kraska, 2007).  
The 1033 Program offers sophisticated military technology to domestic law 
enforcement, which finds ways of using it. Indeed, as Peter Kraska (2007: 508) notes, such 
military-grade material is now deployed as a matter of routine in a wide range of US policing 
contexts in ways which were unheard of and would have been deemed unacceptable some 
three decades ago, for example in searches of private homes: ‘It is critical to recognize that 
these are not forced reaction situations necessitating use of force specialists; instead they 
are the result of police departments choosing to use an extreme and highly dangerous 
tactic, not for terrorists or hostage-takers, but for small-time drug possessors and dealers.’ 
As Kraska (2007: 506) also notes, the rise in use of such militarized policing tactics, units and 
equipment has been astonishing: in the early 1980s the yearly average of SWAT-team 
deployments or callouts stood at 3,000 whereas by 2007 this had risen to 45,000. As Anna 
Feigenbaum and Daniel Weissmann (2016) argue in their compelling study of the world’s 
largest international security trade fair, Milipol – the very name of which advertises the 
convergence of policing and military – such widely attended expos ‘can be seen as a space in 
which the values of police militarisation manifest’ (Feigenbaum & Weissmann, 2016: 485), 
in particular the conflation between political dissent and insurgency, and such events also 
demonstrate that, for a security industry developing new technologies, ‘the police and the 
military are increasingly regarded as two slices of the same pie’ (482).  
Neocleous (2014) has argued that the consensus among scholars that the elision of 
war with police power is a recent development rests on a misconception: both should 
rather be recognized as historically interdependent forms of state power deployed together 
in pursuit of primitive accumulation. Wall (2016: 1125-6) takes up Neocleous’s argument to 
query the idea of police militarization, arguing that policing in North America emerged out 
of settler and plantation colonialism, such that ‘at least in the US, police power has long 
been necropolitical, even if liberal ideology often works to mask this fact’ (1126). Public 
dismay at the militarized response by Ferguson police department to protests following the 
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shooting of Michael Brown in August 2014 led Obama to sign Executive Order 13688, 
restricting the types of military equipment that could be supplied to police forces under the 
1033 Program (Delehanty et al., 2017: 1). In August 2017, his successor lifted these 
restrictions with his own Executive Order (Johnson, 2017). Since Ferguson, several US 
legislators opposed to police militarization have attempted to introduce a number of 
different measures to limit or end the 1033 Program. Wall may be right that US policing’s 
necropolitics has long been masked by liberal ideology; however, in framing his own bill, 
Congressman Hank Johnson appealed directly to that very ideology, in the form of James 
Madison’s warning in 1787 against a standing army (Johnson, 2017). These recent 
developments suggest that notwithstanding doubts raised by Neocleous and Wall about the 
historical cogency of the idea of police militarization, the concept still has meaning in the 
practice of contemporary US politics and, moreover, that however problematic liberal 
ideology may be in occluding the colonialist past of domestic policing, it can nevertheless be 
put to use today in service of progressive causes. Empirical research on the 1033 Program 
(Delehanty, 2017: 3) has given scientific credibility to a widely held convication among 
activists by showing that there is a statistically significant relationship between receipt of 
more military equipment and the number of civilians killed by the police. This suggests that 
police militarization, though it may not be an entirely satisfactory concept, can help to 
identify and articulate a serious problem. Wall and Neocleous could respond in turn that the 
problem with the liberal paradigm in which police militarization has meaning is precisely 
that its forgetting of the necropolitical colonialist past of US policing means it cannot 
adequately understand, still less satisfactorily address, disproportionate police violence 
against racialized populations – Johnson’s bill and others like it, after all, are doomed to fail 
in the present political climate and figures for 2017 suggest that there has been a decline of 
2% from 2016 in the numbers of police charged in relation to killings of civilians, to 1% 
(Mapping Police Violence, 2018). I cannot pursue further here this discussion of police 
militarization but suggest that despite serious historical and conceptual inadequacies 
identified by Neocleous and Wall, it would be unwise to discard a notion that nevertheless 
has meaning and use in the contemporary struggle against racist police violence.  
Although there are no reports to my knowledge of police deploying weaponized 
aerial drones in the US, it is apparent that local police forces and federal agencies such as 
Border Control are continuing to invest very heavily in airbone surveillance drones (Farivar, 
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2016b) and, according to research published by the Bard College Center for the Study of the 
Drone (2017: 1), the pace of drone acquisitions has recently accelerated rapidly, with more 
acquisitions taking place in 2016 than in all of the years 2009-2015 combined. Most of these 
purchases have been of ‘consumer drones’ (Bard, 2017: 5), rather than specialist drones 
marketed by defence companies, and the vast majority are relatively inexpensive small 
drones manufactured by the Chinese company DJI. This is unlikely to be the expression of a 
‘China First’ procurement policy and contrasts markedly with the May 2018 Federal Aviation 
Authority (FAA) decision to reject all of the dozen applications submitted by DJI in a 
competition to run two-year experimental projects for commercial and medical drones over 
US territory (BBC, 2018). I would suggest that US police departments have been wary of 
purchasing larger drones following regulatory and practical difficulties experienced by 
Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office (near Houston), whose much larger $220,000 
Shadowhawk helicopter drone  – mentioned in passing by Chamayou (2015: 203), who 
reports comments by police that they were ‘open to the idea of adding non-lethal weapons 
like tear gas, rubber bullets or Taser-style rounds’ – was probably too large to fly under FAA 
regulations and crashed spectacularly into one of the force’s own armoured vehicles in 2012 
during a photo-op (Musgrave, 2013; Salter, 2014: 170-1).  
There has also been significant investment in surveillance drones in the UK, with 
Surrey Police, for example, having being given £250,000 in 2015 by the Home Office to 
expand its stock of surveillance drones from one to five; that force has also trained some 
thirty of its officers in their use (Wired, 2016). Devon and Cornwall Police announced a 
significant expansion of their use of drones in March 2017, including the recruitment of a 
‘drone manager’ (The Telegraph, 2017). In total around fifty countries now operate drones 
within their national territory (Neocleous, 2014: 156).  
There has been interest for some time among US police forces in the weaponization 
of airborne drones and it is a significant development that North Dakota has now legalized 
the weaponization of aerial police drones, though only with ‘non-lethal’ or ‘less lethal’ 
weapons systems (NLWs), and that some other states such as Connecticut have seriously 
contemplated permitting lethal weaponization (Wagner, 2015; Ortiz, 2017). Although 
hitherto police have been restricted in the types and sizes of drones they can operate, by 
FAA regulations, which in turn restricts the scope for weaponization, these rules could be 
changed overnight. 
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Weaponized land-based and airborne drones equipped with ‘non-lethal’ or ‘less 
lethal’ weapons systems (NLWs) such as pepper spray and tear gas exist, as the invaluable 
inventory report, Tear Gassing by Remote Control (Remote Control project, 2015), attests: 
the Skunk Riot Control Copter, manufactured in South Africa, has reportedly been sold to 
police in India, Turkey and South Africa itself, as well as to mining companies (Sputnik, 2015; 
Remote Control project, 2015). There are already numerous land-based drone equivalents 
kitted out with NLWs, for example the Spanish-manufactured RiotBot, and the Israeli-
manufactured Dogo, a ‘tactical combat robot’, available with an integrated pistol as 
standard or with ‘less-lethal’ options (Technorobot, 2016; General Robotics, 2016). The 
expanding market for chemical NLWs in policing capitalises on a loophole in the Chemical 
Weapons Convention forbidding the use of non-lethal chemical agents in inter-state war 
while allowing them for domestic law enforcement. As Marijn Nieuwenhuis (2016: 512) 
notes, the worldwide market for airborne chemical NLWs for policing purposes is forecast to 
grow from US$3201.6m in 2014 to $4868.1m in 2021.  
As Chamayou’s earlier book (2012) on the cynegetic power of the police manhunt 
indicates, he also rejects many of the liberal assumptions about police militarization 
critiqued by Neocleous and Wall: in particular, the nostalgic misconception forgetful of 
colonialism and other forms of primitive accumulation that policing was once a humane and 
benign activity, before it was taken over by militarism. Chamayou (2015: 32-3) emphasises 
the convergence of policing and military logics in US killer drone operations abroad, which 
he calls ‘hybrid operations, the enfants terribles of the police and the army’ (2015: 32-3). He 
argues that the paradigm under which these operations have been conducted has shifted 
from the military doctrine of counterinsurgency to the policing logic of counter-terrorism, 
with the dramatic escalation of drone warfare under Obama signalling the triumph of the 
counter-terrorism paradigm among senior figures in the US security establishment: 
‘Whereas counterinsurgency strategy implies (apart from brute force) compromise, 
diplomatic action, pressure, and agreements, all of which operate under constraint, 
antiterrorism precludes any political treatment of the conflict’ (Chamayou, 2015: 69).  
Whereas counterinsurgency strategy focuses not only on those carrying out armed 
resistance but also on the surrounding population to which they are connected (though 
primarily to manipulate and subdue them, I would add), the ‘policing logic’ of anti-terrorism 
‘individualizes the problem and reduces its objectives to neutralizing, on a case-by-case 
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basis, as many suspects as possible’ (Chamayou, 2015: 68). Individualizes and also, in line 
with Louise Amoore’s (2014) Deleuzian analysis of contemporary security technologies, 
‘dividualizes’, in the sense that the identification of most targets abroad now relies far less 
on individual identity in any personalised, psychological or developed biographical sense 
and instead on algorithmic detection of anomalous patterns, terrorist ‘signatures’, in the 
subpersonal data, as unknown dangers are envisaged as mere possibilities against which 
intervention can still be justified, even when they are not in an actuarial sense probabilities.  
Although the convergence of policing and military logics is clear enough in the Dallas 
case, the use of the killer robot there did not, of course, involve any of the background 
technologies of targeting and profiling by algorithmic and semi-automated systems which is 
so significant a dimension of US drone operations abroad. Nevertheless, as David Garland 
(1997: 181) and Bernard Harcourt (2007: 16) have noted, domestic policing already relies to 
a very large extent on ‘actuarial’ approaches, in the sense that operational decisions about 
the distribution of resouces rely on ‘statistical methods – rather than clinical methods – on 
large datasets of criminal offending rates in order to determine the different levels of 
offending associated with a group or with one or more group traits and, on the basis of 
those correlations, to predict the past, present, or future criminal behavior of a particular 
person and to administer a criminal justice outcome for that individual.’ Moreover, it is 
relatively easy for politicians elected on a security mandate – whether in New York City or 
the Paris area, say – to have a sharp impact on crime figures by using a coordinated 
combination of, on the one hand, actuarial analysis and targeted resource distribution and, 
on the other, police performance management techniques to produce massive increases in 
arrest and conviction rates for petty offenses committed in deprived neighbourhoods 
(Schneider, 2014: 141; Fassin, 2015: 65). While this may produce a superficially tidier and 
more orderly city, it also creates through securitization a far less equal, more discriminatory 
and more fearful society. In light of the powerful supporting role which the ‘broken 
windows theory’ of crime played, alongside CompStat and new locally accountable 
reporting practices, in thus reducing crime rates in New York City after Rudolph Giuliani’s 
election as mayor in 1993, it is not difficult to envisage a new iteration of his ‘quality of life’ 
(‘zero tolerance’) policing in which drones kitted out with disabling NLW ‘options’ would 
systematically be deployed for the immediate disuasion of those spraying graffiti, for 
example. The project would be piloted in a ‘troubled’ area, data would be gathered to show 
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it had been ‘effective’ – this term being understood in a socially limited but rigorously 
measurable sense – and it could then be rolled out; it would start out by targeting 
individuals in flagrante delicto and gradually expand into pre-emptive interventions. Such a 
prospect would be the logical continuation of a trend in British and US policing noted over 
the last forty years by Garland (2002: 171) towards identifying ‘criminogenic situations that 
can be altered in ways that make them less vulnerable to criminal events, less inviting to 
potential offenders’. Would communities targeted by such measures accept them? Shaw 
(2016a: 20) predicts that automated drone policing would target the very same ‘surplus 
populations’ produced in part by automation in other sectors of the economy, those 
‘disposable’ members of the community lurking ‘in the shadows of skyscrapers and 
shopping malls […] great blocs of humanity unable to find work’, who are not especially 
profitable consumers because they lack purchasing power. One answer is thus to suggest 
that such populations would simply not be given a say in the matter, any more than surplus 
populations of the Paris suburbs policed by the paramilitary Brigade anti-Criminalité 
documented by Didier Fassin (2013) are consulted about whether that is their preferred 
style of policing. However, Shaw’s gloomy yet plausible prognosis assumes not only that 
these populations will not rise up in armed insurgency against these very methods but also 
that they will have been entirely abandoned to their fate – affectively, ethically and 
politically – by an overwhelming majority of other more privileged segments of the 
population. Of course, this is possible and one can point to some areas in which such 
abandonment has arguably already occurred but equally in such circumstances states tend – 
with some notable exceptions – to eschew forms of policing likely to provoke mass armed 
insurrection. Furthermore, supposing there were such a largely indifferent, quiescent and 
more privileged majority, the spectacle of excessive policing force deployed against a 
surplus population might awaken that slumbering majority to a politics of solidarity. 
To summarise the current situation: ‘actuarial’ profiling is well established in 
domestic policing in the US and Britain (among other countries), as is the frequent use of 
lethal force across what are plainly discriminatory demographic distributions (yet which 
have a certain basis in a certain kind of evidence, confected in large part by what Harcourt 
(2007: 28-9) terms the ‘ratchet’ effect of actuarially-driven policing). So too is the precedent 
for drone-delivered lethal force, although it is indeed important to recognise that policing 
has always been violent, long before drones. However, possibilistic interventions and 
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robotically-delivered lethal or incapacitatory force have yet to be connected in policing 
contexts in the systematic way which characterizes US drone operations abroad. In the next 
section I envisage possible forms of the domestic policing drone.  
 
 
(iii) Like the police, drones are instruments of bureaucracy 
 
Chamayou (2015: 214) suggests that the drone ‘pilot’ in his container in Nevada is ‘already 
little more than the fetishized avatar of the state’s bureaucratic machine’. In choosing 
future drone pilots, selectors prefer those who can ‘compartmentalize’ (Chamayou, 2015: 
123) – the French is cloisonner: those who can partition, who can subdivide their own lives 
into compartments in which they do their work in a metal box in a carpark in the desert, in 
networked communication with dozens or hundreds of other compartments across the 
world, the deadly effects of which work are felt in yet another compartment, the ‘kill box’ 
thousands of miles away, before driving to the supermarket and home to their families. 
Echoing Chamayou, Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter (2014) have argued that bureaucracy, 
specifically the analysis of the bureaucratization of violence and politics in Hannah Arendt’s 
work, offers a valuable critical perspective on drone killings abroad and Shaw (2016b) has 
made a similar claim about the future of domestic drone policing. Shaw and Akhter (2014: 
220) argue that the CIA has been operating largely within a counter-terrorist paradigm since 
the mid-1980s but whereas Chamayou calls this a policing paradigm, they characterize it in 
terms of bureaucracy. Since then, a series of presidential directives has led to the expansion 
of US sovereignty, ‘connecting battlefield with boardroom’ (221), and culminating in 
Obama’s ‘Terror Tuesday’ business meetings with their PowerPoint presentations and 
‘disposition matrix’, ‘the bureaucratic knife-edge’ (211) of his administration’s programme 
of targeted killings. However, they also suggest that because the programme has been 
established by gradual bureaucratic accretion, nobody owns or is accountable for it in a full 
sense since ‘a well-oiled bureaucratic machine soon automates the very “masters” who are 
meant to be in control’ (230).  
In his later book, Shaw (2016b: 24) extends this approach to domestic policing, 
asserting that ‘Today, a hyperrational form of bureaucratic authority governs technological 
civilization. Arendt called this a “rule by Nobody”, an abstract system of control, a “tyranny 
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without a tyrant”, in which Nobody is held accountable for their actions. With the 
sophisticated machines that enclose the planet, there is a sense that the rule by Nobody is 
fundamentally a rule by technics.’ Drawing variously on Sloterdijk, Deleuze, Neocleous and 
radical historiography on the enclosure of the commons, Shaw suggests compellingly that 
contemporary bureaucratic systems of surveillance and intervention seek to construct 
modulatory capsular enclosures which would transform the world into an open prison: ‘the 
Predator Empire uses satellites, drones, and software algorithms to secure the spheres in 
which individuals are born, become, and die’ (Shaw, 2016b: 7). It is clear that the drone 
functions synecdochally here for the contemporary system of bureaucratic government in 
which it plays a major role and that the dangers which Shaw is using it to designate are 
extremely wide-ranging: ‘The existential emergency we face is real and pressing: at its most 
dangerous level, humans dissolve entirely into the machines that enclose them’ (Shaw, 
2016b: 175). Philosopher of technology Bernard Stiegler (2016: 46-8, 50) briefly addresses 
Chamayou’s drone book in very similar terms: what interests Stiegler most is the 
disappearance of the operator into the drone, a process which Stiegler – after Debord and 
Marx – calls ‘proletarianization’: ‘Soldiers who operate drones disappear into the weapon 
that replaces them, just as workers disappear into the machines that turn them into 
proletarians’. Thus the drone and its operator become for Stiegler a particular illustration of 
a general concept designating one degraded form of, or moment in, the evolving 
relationship between human beings and technical objects: ‘proletarianization’. Like Shaw, 
Stiegler is concerned that without adequeate theoretical and practical understanding of the 
process of automation which the drone designates synecdochally, human subjects will 
become definitively alienated in the technical objects and machinic worlds they have 
created. Stielger has expressed greater optimism about the prospect of our harnessing 
these technologies to resist our own proletarianizing disappareance into a controlling 
machine but Shaw and Akhter are far more alert to the sinister creeping process of anti-
democratic accretion which has already given us drone killings, a process which they 
characterize in terms of bureaucracy. 
Is it possible to integrate Chamayou’s emphasis on counter-terrorism as a policing 
technique with Shaw and Akhter’s characterization of the same paradigm in terms of 
bureaucracy? Although Arendt’s critique of bureaucracy is invaluable, I would suggest that 
bureaucracy under neoliberalism, which the policing drone would serve, functions rather 
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differently from the systems with which Arendt was concerned. In his polemical analysis of 
bureaucracy today, David Graeber (2015: 73) notes that contrary to popular belief most 
police work has nothing to do with fighting or solving crimes: ‘it has to do with regulations, 
or, to put it slightly more technically, with the scientific application of physical force, or the 
threat of physical force, to aid in the resolution of administrative problems […]. Police are 
bureaucrats with weapons.’ Graeber (2015: 74) also makes an important point about the 
way in which this bureaucratic police order has expansionist designs: ‘It has come to the 
point that it’s not at all unusual for a citizen in a contemporary industrialized democracy to 
spend several hours a day reading books, watching movies, or viewing TV shows that invite 
them to look at the world from a police point of view, and to vicariously participate in their 
exploits’. The process of attentional capture Graeber describes would better be 
characterized in terms of lure or seduction than invitation but he nonetheless identifies the 
insidious ideological counterpart of the process by which the security state’s productive 
narrativization of insecurity seeks to enlist citizens and their perceptual organs as auxiliaries 
or prostheses: ‘You are not only the object of security but also the subject. You answer the 
call to be vigilant, constantly on watch for suspicious activity on the subway, devious designs 
of your seatmate on the airplane, malicious motives of your neighbours. Fear justifies 
volunteering your pair of eyes and your alert attention to a seemingly universal security 
machine.’ (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 20). Such suspicion of others’ motives is arguably a 
defining principle of the police perspective (Jobard and de Maillard, 2015: 101) and to that 
extent that this way of looking is spreading societies are becoming more individualized or 
capsular. 
The ongoing expansion of the bureaucratic ‘police order’ (Rancière, 1995) may be 
most apparent in security settings but it is at work across all levels of society, including in 
the proliferation of control mechanisms (Garland, 2002: 194-5), the extension of audit 
culture, the increasingly enveloping regulation of middle-class labour by individualized 
performance management (Lane, 2018) and the oppresively proletarianizing stipulation of 
‘best practices’ (Brown, 2015: 139). I would suggest that the most apt name for the 
contemporary bureaucratic police order I have been describing is the one it invariably uses 
to describe itself: ‘governance’. As Wendy Brown (2015: 123) argues, ‘“Governance” 
signifies a specific mode of governing that is evacuated of agents and institutionalized in 
processes, norms, and practices’. Governance is the neoliberal form of anti-democratic 
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bureaucracy and it is governance which policing drones will serve. Certainly, the police 
officer who detonated the C-4 to kill Johnson and a marine on the battlefield could both be 
thought of as drones – semi-automated extrusions of the bureaucratic apparatus – but they 
are far from alone in that. The key point about governance is that it incites all subjects to 
become its self-automating drones, to plug themselves into its assemblage, to serve as its 
prosthetic organs, to choose to confine themselves to its modular flexible cages of role and 
function. More than ever, subjects are incited to view the world from the police perspective 
of governance, to identify with an administering power of control, to become drones.  
The bureaucratization of the kill chain has been characterized by Elke Schwarz (2016: 
70) in terms of a ‘adiaphorization’, a term taken from theology by Zygmunt Bauman and 
used by Schwarz to refer to the artificial production of an amoral space. Such production is 
typical of the bureacracy of neoliberal governance: the ethical is subsumed as just one 
moment in an articulated chain of administrative processes and ethical deliberation is 
dissolved into a calculus of risk which still permits and indeed often justifies the killing of 
innocents.  
 
 
Conclusion: a theory of the weaponized policing drone and a response to Arthur Bradley 
 
I started out from the deployment of an artisanally confected land-based killer policing 
drone in the hope that the facts of that unprecedented incident in Dallas would, in the shifts 
of emphasis they effected, enable a probing discussion of drone theory, in particular that of 
Chamayou’s. I also wanted to use the incident to speculate in an informed way about the 
future of weaponized drones as techniques of domestic policing. I proceeded by working 
through three broadly delineated areas of scepticism about drone theory as it intersects 
with policing and shall present a synthesis of these findings before responding briefly to 
Arthur Bradley’s essay.  
Today’s military drones are not unprecedented technologies but nor can their 
singularity be completely subsumed into the history of their antecedents; moreover, the 
‘politics of verticality’ essential to their psychotechnical projection of power is likely to be 
tempered in tomorrow’s swarming horizontal police drones. Discussions of the future of 
policing drones which construe them as symptoms of police militarization operate, as 
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Neocleous and Wall have demonstrated, with a historically and conceptually inadequate 
understanding of policing, even if the idea of police militarization remains politically 
meaningful. Sceptics of drone theory have suggested that describing drones as extrusions of 
the bureaucratic apparatus is not sufficient to distinguish them from marines or other 
disciplined servants of order. While I concede that police, marines and drones can certainly 
all be construed as extrusions of this sort, the contemporary police order of bureaucracy I 
have called ‘governance’ seeks to enlist all subjects as its drones. The ongoing expansion of 
this order incites subjects to identify with administering power and at the maximal 
synecdochic reach of critical drone theory, this is what the universalising ambition of the 
policing drone implies: the saturation of mental, physical and metaphysical space, objects 
and subjects, buildings and ideas, with human-machinic assemblages that continually view 
and reconstruct the world from the perspective of governance. Does this mean the policing 
drone has become too general to define? I suggest not. The policing drone, be it mainly 
human, mainly machinic, or a composite assemblage, effects the cynegetic ‘snap-to-grid’ 
function of governance: the policing drone detects and moves towards the anomalous and 
the suspicious, as a hunter-shepherd, seeking to bring it back within the flexible lines of 
governance’s nevertheless all too controlling modular grid.  
One prominent defender of US drone killings abroad, Amitai Etzioni (2010: 69), 
suggests how the policing drone will function as a synecdoche for neoliberal governance: he 
argues that collateral damage could be reduced by ‘enabling the general population to leave 
an area before an attack’. This implies that when confronted by possibilistic algorithmic 
profiling which establishes dividual connections of association and uses them to mark out 
individuals for preventative extrajudicial killing, it will now be the duty of the targeted to 
display their own dissociation from suspect elements, to actively exhibit their self-distancing 
from designated risks or face the possibility of annihilation as part of a generalized duty of 
showy self-entrepreneurship. This is the strong form which normalization takes in 
neoliberalism’s police order of governance.  
 
* 
 
Arthur Bradley, in his essay for this special section, develops the Hobbesian strand of 
Chamayou’s drone theory to such an extent that what appears to be a repatriation of killer 
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drones seems no more, or less, than the radical realization of one of the possibilities 
inherent in the relationship between subject and sovereign: subjects pre-authorize 
automated acts of self-killing directed against them. However exactly we understand such a 
repatriation (or, as it appears in Bradley’s account, a radicalization of already inherent 
possibilites), I would suggest that the scope for resistance lies in continually exposing the 
entirely fictive though technically efficacious quality of the act of authorization as Hobbes 
and his followers envisage it, for example by cultivating first an innner secession from such 
manipulative storytelling followed by an outer secession which secures, alone or with a 
swarm of like-minded others, zones of refuge against the sovereign’s weaponized policing 
technologies, whether permanently or in temporary fields of mobile insurrection.  
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